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Abstract: We analyze the design of contracts between an innovator and a developer
in a framework that allows for asymmetric information, production of pre-contractual
evidence, moral hazard and imperfect enforcement of intellectual property rights. The
innovator is privately informed about the quality of his idea and may produce forgeable
evidence of it at the negotiation stage. Upon contracting, the developer exerts some non-
verifiable effort which improves the expected return of the innovation. Under asymmetric
information, a good innovator signals the quality of his project by keeping some royalties.
This has two drawbacks on incentives. First, moral hazard on the developer’s side is exac-
erbated. Second, the attractiveness for the developer of leaving the current relationship to
start a new one increases. This trade-off between signaling and moral hazard is sensitive
to the nature of the intellectual property rights that prevail, and to the technology for
producing pre-contractual evidence. Royalties are more attractive when property rights
are easy to enforce while paid-up licences prevail otherwise. Various robustness checks for
these findings are also provided.
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1 Introduction
Although the diffusion of knowledge plays a crucial role in economic growth by intro-
ducing increasing returns and positive externalities,1 little is known about the exact mi-
croeconomic process by which information and ideas move along the supply chain in the
production of knowledge. This is surprising given that economists, following the seminal
work of Arrow (1962), have long been aware of the importance of resource allocation in
promoting invention, and should have drawn from those concerns some lessons for the
organization of R&D activities. The objective of this paper is to fill that gap. Taking this
Arrowian perspective, we open the black-box of the micro-relationship between innovators
who have ideas but often lack the commercial and financial expertise to develop them and
developers (for instance customers/financiers) who provide such complementary expertise
and exert their competencies at later stages of the R&D process.
At first glance, the bilateral relationship between an innovator and a developer might
be hindered by three major contractual hazards. Each one is a source of significant
transaction costs in the transmission of knowledge. First, since commercial ideas may
contain technical aspects often hard to describe contractually but privately known by
innovators, contracting is subject to asymmetric information. The negotiation process
may require the informed party to disclose evidence to reduce this information gap in
which case the production of such evidence is an important part of contracting. Second,
the effort of the developer during the development stage of the project may be difficult
to verify; a moral hazard issue. Lastly, knowledge is a public good and, during the
negotiation with the innovator, the developer may infer most of the potential market
value of the innovator’s idea: an issue related to the protection of property rights. This
paper analyzes how the design of contracts between an informed innovator and a developer
depends on these three important ingredients.
Practitioners are well-aware of these contractual hazards and are constantly looking
for ways to mitigate them.2 Broadly speaking, this paper analyzes the direction toward
1See the literature on endogenous growth, in particular Aghion and Howitt (1998).
2In a survey of contractual problems in the pharmaceutical industry, Binns and Driscoll (1998) re-
ported that “Many organizations that perform R&D projects, particularly at an early stage in the drug
development cycle, may contribute unique skills and expertise to the planning and execution of a project
that ultimately leads to a successful product. In many cases, such organizations may be reluctant to hand
over the ownership of intellectual property (created by them) without some control over its subsequent use
and exploitation, and without any right themselves to use it, even if they have been promised royalties in
the event of a successful product. In almost every case, however, there should be no reason why a solution
cannot be found that satisfies everyone’s concerns by appropriately addressing ownership, access and user
rights and the protection, management and exploitation of intellectual property in the R&D contract.”
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which optimal contracting for an innovation should be tilted, and in particular how the
return of an innovation should be shared. We pay particular attention to the role played
by the strength of intellectual property rights (hereafter IPRs) in shaping those contracts.
Main results. Our key finding is that private information on the quality of an idea re-
quires innovators to keep significant royalties in the project as a credible mean of signaling
that it is worth undertaking. Moreover, we show that royalties are much more likely to
be used in environments with strong IPRs.
A major contribution of this paper is the analysis of the process by which innovators
reveal information and the links between this process and the form of incentive contracts
between innovators and developers. Our modeling is quite general and allows both for
information revelation through direct disclosure of evidence and through contract design.
The first step is costly, i.e., at the cost of forging evidence, even a bad innovator can
come with “hard evidence” that his idea is good enough. Since there is always the
possibility for a bad innovator to forge favorable evidence, a good innovator must signal
himself by specifying a particular contract design that would not be attractive to a bad
innovator. This creates some kind of substitutability between the two forms of information
revelation.3 The more costly forging evidence is, the easier it is for a good innovator to
convince the developer of the quality of his idea through the contract design, in other
words, royalties become less attractive. This approach has a broad appeal and makes it
easy to trace out the consequences of various technologies which provide evidence on the
kind of contractual arrangements that might prevail.
Comparative statics. First, the trade-off between signaling and moral hazard is some-
what relaxed when forging favorable evidence on the quality of the project becomes harder.
In other words, leaving royalties to innovators is more likely when direct devices for com-
municating information at the negotiation stage are less credible. Second, leaving more
royalties to innovators also exacerbates the developer’s incentives to steal ideas which are
“on the table.” This is a more attractive strategy when IPRs are weak.
Empirical evidence. To understand the practical relevance of these issues, consider
the example of corporate licensing. Corporate licensing between upstream and down-
stream units features informational and technological transfers which are at the core of
our investigation. Those transfers are of course impeded by the contractual hazards we
stressed above. Following the empirical work by Anand and Khanna (2000) and the clas-
sical study by Rostoker (1984), we may indeed distinguish industries according to the
3In this respect, we rely on the important works of Bull and Watson (2001, 2007), Lacker and Weinberg
(1989) and Maggi and Roriguez-Clare (1995) who build principal-agent models where contract design
depends on the cost of producing evidence. We borrow from them this general idea but apply it in a
signaling environment. (For similar insights, see also Kartik, 2008.) To the best of our knowledge, this
application is new.
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strength of IPRs that prevail.4 According to this classification, the industries with the
weakest property rights are also the industries where reverse engineering is commonly
found. Equipped with this classification, the empirical works provide strong support for
our theoretical findings: When property rights are strong enough, the authors found that
royalties are much more likely to be used. Moving from the mechanical industry where
IPRs are weak, to electrical, chemical and biological industries where IPRs are increas-
ingly stronger, royalties increase respectively from 65, 68, 71 to 76% in the cases surveyed
in Rostoker (1984).
Literature review. Our paper belongs to a broader literature addressing information
transmission in R&D environments. This literature can be roughly organized along two
dimensions. First, some authors have tackled this issue in contexts where information
transmission occurs between competing firms or between an upstream innovator and an
agent (developing or marketing unit) operating in a downstream market. Second, other
authors have studied how contracts can be used to signal information on the value of an
innovation.
As far as information disclosure towards competitors is concerned, the focus of the
literature has been on understanding whether valuable information should be disclosed,
either directly by selling patents or indirectly through market behavior. In that line of
research, the seminal paper by Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) examined an important
trade-off between the cost of publicly disclosing valuable information which reduces an
informational advantage vis-a`-vis competing rivals and its benefit in signaling value to
the capital market so that outside finance becomes cheaper. Taking instead a mechanism
design perspective, Bhattacharya, Glazer and Sappington (1990, 1992) studied optimal
licensing mechanisms inducing information sharing and efficient R&D efforts, whereas
d’Aspremont, Bhattacharya and Ge´rard-Varet (2000) addressed knowledge disclosure in
the context of an R&D race where a technologically dominant firm can share partially
verifiable knowledge with its rival.5 Anton and Yao (2004) and Bhattacharya and Guriev
(2006) focused on the kind of market competition between innovators and imitators that
takes place once information has been revealed. All these models rely on the possibility
that innovators may only disclose less than what they really know and that it costs nothing
to present such evidence. We will depart from this assumption and assume instead that
the innovator can forge favorable evidence on his project, maybe at some cost, to fool
developers. Forging costly evidence makes it impossible for good innovators to separate
4Even if those authors had no precise information on the form of payments, they showed that cross-
industry differences in exclusive rights provisions or cross-licensing can be explained by the strength of
intellectual property rights.
5In a related vein, Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) and Yosha (1995) studied the role of financiers
in facilitating information sharing among potential competitors and endogenized how much information
might be shared in multilateral financial contracting.
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themselves from bad ones by only releasing pre-contractual evidence. There is ample
room for more credible information revelation by keeping an equity stake in the project.
This point is clearly related to the idea of using contracts to convey some information
to the seller and more particularly in our context to the seminal paper by Gallini and
Wright (1990). These authors explained how licensing contracts should be designed under
asymmetric information. Contrary to our research, information on the quality of an inno-
vation becomes known ex post by competitors. The tension between communicating the
licensor’s information about the quality of his innovation and avoiding being imitated by
competing licensees explains the use of output-based payments and rationalizes the licen-
sors’ rents. Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1991) and Beggs (1992) also followed that
signaling line of research. They analyzed the role played by menus of licensing contracts
with different levels of royalties when the information on the quality of the innovation
is asymmetric. In the absence of any device to credibly disclose information, contract
design is the only remaining tool to communicate information. Accordingly, contracts
are distorted to relax the informed innovator’s incentive constraint. We take stock of the
lessons of those papers but differ from them along several lines. First, we stress the im-
portant trade-off between signaling and downstream moral hazard which has so far been
overlooked.6 Second, we link our results to the strength of IPRs showing an important
correlation between the developer’s incentives within and outside the relationship. Third,
we fully develop the process of information communication. More specifically, we append
to the standard signaling game a pre-contractual stage where evidence can be produced.
Although, at equilibrium, different types of innovators might separate themselves by pro-
ducing costly evidence on how good is their project, there remains ample room for more
credible signaling through contract design. More recently, Anton and Yao (2002) analyzed
the mechanism by which ideas can be sold in a world where IPRs are weak. They derive
a mechanism with partial disclosure in addition to a signaling device to reveal the true
quality of the idea and foster competition between potential sellers while limiting the risk
of expropriation. In our context, the seller can both understate or overstate (at a cost) the
quality of his idea. Moreover, this value can never be directly observed by the buyers. In
short, the types of innovations we are considering are ideas or new technologies the value
of which can hardly be assessed by the seller.7 This makes signaling through contract
design a necessary step.
Lastly, our focus on double-edged incentives between an innovator and a developer
has some connections with the work of Aghion and Tirole (1994a, 1994b). Taking an
incomplete contracts perspective, they considered that property rights are the only tools
to provide incentives for both developers and innovators. They side-stepped the informa-
6For other models of this trade-off in labor economics, general principal-agent models and regulation
see Beaudry (1991), Inderst (2001) and Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2006).
7This is reminiscent of Rockett (1990)’s analysis of new versus old technology licensing.
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tional asymmetries between developers and innovators which was then the key focus of
the literature.8
Outline. Section 2 develops a numerical example showing the simple economics behind
the trade-off between signaling and moral hazard. Section 3 presents the more general
model and a benchmark corresponding to the case where the quality of the innovator’s
idea is known to both parties. Section 4 describes the set of incentive contracts that
induce information revelation on the innovator’s side and effort on the developer’s side.
Section 5 characterizes the equilibrium contract, explains the trade-off between adverse
selection and moral hazard, and provides some comparative statics. Section 6 discusses
some possible extensions of our basic model and provides some robustness checks. Section
7 concludes. Proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The Trade-Off Between Signaling and Moral Haz-
ard: A Bare-Bone Example
In this section, we develop a bare-bone numerical example illustrating the simple eco-
nomics behind the contracting arrangements we will consider in later sections.
Consider an innovator (the principal) who knows how good his idea is and who con-
tracts with a developer, downstream unit or customer (the agent), who has the expertise
or financial capability to develop this idea. Both parties are risk-neutral and have unlim-
ited liability. Both the principal and the agent are needed to complete the project but
each intervenes at different stages throughout the innovation process.
Whether the project will succeed or not is uncertain. The probability of success
depends not only on the innate quality of the innovator’s idea but also on the developer’s
effort in providing further expertise, bringing in outside finance, or improving marketing.
Suppose that the innovator’s idea is good or bad. A good project gives a payoff of 10
dollars with a probability of 0.4 even if the developer contributes little expertise. A
bad project may also have a payoff of 10 dollars but only with a probability of 0.1. By
exerting an effort that costs 1 dollar, the developer increases the probability of success by
0.2 regardless of the quality of the innovator’s idea.
Assume that the innovator has all the bargaining power in designing a contract. Such a
contract should stipulate how the returns on the project are shared. This is done by using
royalties left to the innovator and through a fixed fee that the developer pays upfront to
access the innovator’s idea. If the effort and the quality of the idea are verifiable, then
8Choi (2001) took instead a complete contracting approach and solved for the optimal royalties which
balance incentives on both sides, solving thereby a moral-hazard in teams problem.
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a simple contract stipulating that the developer should exert effort and be compensated
only with a fixed payment of 1 for his cost yields the first-best expected payoffs to the
innovator, respectively 10× (0.4+0.2)−1 = 5 for a good idea and 10× (0.1+0.2)−1 = 2
for a bad one.
Can this outcome still be achieved if the developer’s effort is non-verifiable? The
answer is yes. Provided that the developer enjoys all returns on the project, 10, in case
of success and pays back a fee equal to 5 or 2 depending on whether the idea is good
or bad. Indeed, when enjoying 10 in case of success, the developer has incentives to
provide effort since the incremental expected gain of doing so exceeds its cost, namely
10× 0.2− 1 = 1 > 0. Royalties are not needed in this context.
Of course, this solution is no longer feasible when the quality of the innovator’s idea
is private information. A bad innovator may simply ask also for a fee worth 5. But of
course, the developer may be unable to pay out 5 when the project is a bad one. The
contract must now simultaneously induce innovators to release information on their ideas,
and give the developer a share of the project’s return which is sufficiently large to provide
incentives as well as secure IPRs and avoids the stealing of ideas. The contract design
results from a trade-off between signaling the quality of ideas and providing incentives to
developers to exert effort.
How can this trade-off be mitigated? First, the innovator can provide pre-contractual
evidence on the quality of his idea. A good innovator will certainly provide such favorable
evidence, such as a blue-print or a project outline, at no cost. However, such evidence
can also be forged by a bad innovator at a cost.9 In the most extreme case, that cost
is infinite and a good innovator can always provide enough pre-contractual evidence to
distinguish himself from a bad one. The licensing contract has to induce the developer’s
effort and making the developer residual claimant is enough to achieve this outcome.
At a lower cost of forging evidence, for example say it costs 1 to forge favorable
evidence, a bad innovator can mimic a good one at the pre-contractual stage and again
ask for 5. What can deter this bad innovator from following such a strategy? The answer
depends of course on the cost of forging evidence but also on the contract proposed by the
good innovator. Suppose that the good innovator keeps 6 for himself as royalties when
the project succeeds. This is certainly not enough to induce the developer’s effort since
the expected gain of effort is less than its cost, (10 − 6) × 0.2 − 1 < 0. Accordingly, the
good innovator will ask only for a fee worth (10−6)×0.4 = 1.6. This contract is certainly
9One can think here that the process of building evidence takes time and that it may not be so easy
for a good innovator to provide all evidence on it in a given pre-contractual time period. It is often harder
from a 20 minute seminar to distinguish between a good and a bad paper if the presenter devotes enough
effort to hide the weak part of his analysis whereas a longer 1 hour and a half seminar will leave little
doubt.
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unattractive for a bad innovator. Forging favorable evidence at the pre-contractual stage
and offering the same contract as a good innovator yields 6× 0.1 + 1.6− 1 = 1.2. Instead,
not forging any favorable evidence and offering the full information contract corresponding
to a bad innovator yields a greater payoff of 2. Therefore, to signal himself as having a
good idea, the good innovator asks for more royalties which dampens the developer’s
incentives.
This contract with more royalties can nevertheless be affected by the risk of having
the developer steal the idea and run his own business. Suppose that, once the contract
has been negotiated and the quality of the idea is known, the developer bypasses the
innovator, starts his own business with the idea he has just stolen and makes a net gain of
1. This possibility reduces the incentives for a bad innovator to overstate his idea. More
precisely, an innovator with a good idea can induce effort from the developer without
triggering any imitation by proposing to the developer a bonus of 6 and a fixed fee of 1.6.
Weaker property rights lead to reduced royalties and increased fixed fees.
This example shows that royalties have a signaling value and that there exists a trade-
off between signaling and downstream incentives in this environment. It also stresses the
substitutability between better technology for producing evidence and the use of royalties.
Our analysis formalizes that trade-off.
3 The Model
Let us now present more formally the basic ingredients of our modeling of the developer-
innovator relationship we will study.
∙ Information and evidence production. The quality of the innovator’s idea, 휃, can
be either good 휃¯ or bad 휃 with respective probabilities 휈 and 1 − 휈. Denote Θ = {휃, 휃¯}
and let Δ휃 = 휃¯ − 휃 be the spread of uncertainty on the quality of the innovator’s idea.
Finally, 퐸(⋅) denotes the expectation operator.
The innovator has private information on 휃. The degree of privacy of that information
and how easily it can be conveyed to potential trading partners is an important feature
in our modeling. Indeed, contracts cannot be agreed upon by both parties without being
relatively specific on the idea brought by the innovator. Designing a blue-print, running
intermediary projects of smaller scale to familiarize the developer with the technology,
building the developer’s human capital to learn and master this technology are various
ways of conveying information. This certification process takes time and is surely costly.
When negotiating with a partner, the innovator can release documents, blueprints, and
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other pieces of evidence that can serve as testimonies of the idea quality.10 We follow the
general insights of the contracting literature with costly falsification.11 Indeed, we assume
that an innovator with idea 휃 can always provide enough evidence that his idea is in fact
휃ˆ ∕= 휃 if he incurs a “falsification cost”12 worth 휑(휃ˆ−휃). In other words for each true state
of nature 휃, there exists a piece of evidence “휃” that can be produced, perhaps at some
cost, to make the developer and third-parties, such as Courts of Law, believe that state
휃 has been realized. More precisely, we assume that 휑(푥) > 0 if and only if 푥 > 0 and
휑(푥) = 0 otherwise, and the right-derivative 휑′(0+) exists and is zero. This assumption
captures the idea that although one can provide evidence at no cost that the innovator’s
idea is bad when it really is, the reverse is costly. The cost of forging evidence is more
likely to be high when the innovator is supposed to provide more detailed blue-prints and
earlier sketches of his projects.
∙ Effort. The developer brings his expertise, effort in managing rough ideas, or his
capacity to find outside financing as key inputs to the innovation process. Exerting effort
푒 has a non-monetary cost 휓(푒) = 푒
2
2
for the developer. Downstream moral hazard is
captured by assuming that 푒 is non-verifiable.13
Both the quality of the idea and the developer’s expertise are complements at the
extrinsic margin. However, ideas and expertise are substitutes at the intrinsic margin,
i.e., they enter additively in the probability 푝(휃, 푒) = 휃+휆푒 that an innovation worth 휋 is
realized.14 Here 휆 parameterizes how important the developer’s effort is for the project.
Under full information, the probability of innovation would be given by 휃 + 휆2휋 so we
need to assume that 휃¯ + 휆2휋 < 1.
Our contracting environment thus entails bilateral asymmetric information with both
adverse selection and moral hazard.
∙ Contracts. Without loss of generality, a contract between the innovator and the
developer consists first of an upfront payment 푎 paid by the developer to get access to
the innovator’s idea and second of a bonus 푤 left to the developer when the innovation
succeeds. The royalties 휋−푤 are left to the innovator. Of course, 푤 ∈ [0, 휋], i.e., the bonus
10We refer to Bull and Watson (2001, 2007) for some previous works explicitly incorporating the
production of verifiable knowledge into a mechanism design framework.
11See Lacker and Weinberg (1989) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) for instance.
12This cost is assumed to be unobservable but, as we will see, not borne at the equilibrium anyway.
13The choice of a quadratic disutility of effort is just made for tractability. Our results are robust to
the choice of other functional forms as long as 휓(푒) remains increasing and convex.
14The assumption that the value of the innovation 휋 is fixed is standard in the literature. See Aghion
and Tirole (1994a) for instance. Alternatively, this is just a matter of relabeling variables to view the
developer’s effort as affecting the overall value of the projet which is now a random variable given by
휋˜ = 휃+휆푒+ 휖˜ where 휖˜ is a random variable with zero mean. A contract will now share that profit between
the innovator and the developer for each realization of 휖˜. Taking expectations over 휖˜ would lead to the
same analysis as developed below.
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is non-negative and cannot exceed the value of the innovation 휋. For further reference,
we will denote 풞 = (푎, 푤) for such a contract.
A contract with maximal bonus (or no royalties) 휋 = 푤 and a positive up-front
payment 푎 > 0 makes the developer residual claimant for developing projects. The
innovator is then selling his idea to the developer for a fee. A contract such that 휋 >
푤 corresponds to the case where the innovator is at least partially rewarded through
royalties. In this article, we will be particularly interested in the amount of royalties kept
by the innovator under various circumstances.
Under asymmetric information, contracting may reveal information through two differ-
ent channels. First, the innovator may release pieces of evidence which directly convince
the developer, even if the latter knows that evidence may have been forged. Second, the
innovator may signal information simply through contract design. We will be particu-
larly concerned with the interaction between this signaling device and the falsification
technology. By choosing different fixed fees and bonuses, the innovator may reveal to the
developer how valuable his idea is. This will typically be the case in the separating per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium we consider later, in which different innovators choose different
levels of royalties. In other words, even though a bad innovator may have provided favor-
able evidence at the pre-contractual stage, a good innovator may still find it attractive to
distinguish himself through an adequate contract design that is not found attractive by a
bad innovator. Of course, the design of this contract depends on how easy it is to falsify
evidence.
∙ Enforcement. Once the quality of the idea has been learned through contracting,
the developer may find it valuable to leave the contractual relationship and run his own
business. Doing so may require duplicating infrastructures, investments in human capital,
losing marketable reputation for keeping trade secrets, paying fines for breach of contract
and other direct and indirect costs. All the extra costs of setting up a new business
can be modeled by assuming that the developer incurs a fixed cost 퐼 once he reneges.
Alternatively, that fixed cost can be viewed as a measure of how difficult it is to enforce
IPRs as in Gallini (1992). In that respect, having 퐼 large (resp. small) means that IPRs
are easily (resp. hardly) enforceable.15
The probability of having a successful project when the developer steals the idea
and runs his own business without the innovator is strictly less than its value inside the
relationship. We write it as 훾(휃 + 휆푒)휋 where 훾 ∈ [0, 1[. This assumption captures two
essential features. First, the innovator’s human capital might also be a key input of
15A word of caution is necessary here. Reneging on a contract has also payoff consequences for the
innovator which may pocket part of 퐼 under the form of patents, copyrights, trade secrecy and confiden-
tiality agreements. Our modeling focuses thus on the part of these fixed costs of leaving the relationship
and starting a new business which is not recovered by the innovator.
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the development process and this capital disappears when the developer dispenses with
the innovator.16 Another interpretation is that a developer who steals an idea exposes
himself to the threat of the innovator releasing this idea to other potential downstream
competitors as in Anton and Yao (1994). Downstream competition erodes profits and
expected gains and this effect is captured by an exogenous factor 훾 less than one.
The lower return on effort outside the relationship ensures that the innovator and the
developer may find some benefits from contracting together. In doing so, the developer
can guarantee himself a state-dependent reservation utility 푢(휃) which corresponds to his
payoff when stealing the idea and running his own business:
푢(휃) = max
{
0,max
푒
(휃 + 휆푒)훾휋 − 푒
2
2
− 퐼
}
= max
{
0, 휃훾휋 +
휆2훾2휋2
2
− 퐼
}
.
Three cases of interests will be analyzed depending on 퐼.
∙ Large imitation costs: 푢(휃¯) = 푢(휃) = 0. In this case, IPRs are easily enforced.
The developer never finds it worthwhile to start a new business after having stolen
the innovator’s idea because the fixed cost of doing so is too large.
∙ Low imitation costs: 푢(휃¯) > 푢(휃) > 0. This case corresponds to the situation
where IPRs are hard to enforce. The developer finds it easy to renege and to leave
the relationship to start a valuable business with the stolen idea.
∙ Intermediate imitation costs: 푢(휃¯) > 0 = 푢(휃). In this last case, only good
ideas are worth being stolen by the developer.
It turns out that, beyond the particular analysis of all these cases, only the difference
푢(휃¯)− 푢(휃) matters in determining contractual distortions as we will see below.17
∙ Timing. The contractual relationship between the innovator and the developer unfolds
as follows:
∙ First, the innovator discovers 휃.
∙ Second, the innovator provides evidence “휃ˆ” on the quality of his idea and, simul-
taneously offers the contract 풞 = (푎, 푤) to the developer.18
16The assumption 훾 < 1 ensures that the second-best distortion of the bonus that we will derive later
on is always positive. On the contrary, assume that 훾 = 1 and 퐼 small enough, then the innovator cannot
distort the bonus for signaling reasons without inducing expropriation.
17Our model could easily account for 퐼 being dependent on 휃. This might arise for instance when
fixed-costs for setting a new business after having stolen a good idea are smaller than when the stolen
idea turns out to be bad.
18Whether releasing evidence and designing contract terms occur simultaneously or sequentially has
no consequence on the outcome of the game. It might sometimes be relevant for references to real-world
practices to see the evidence production stage as pre-contractual.
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∙ Third, the developer uses the information he has learned from observing the choice
of the contract 풞 and the evidence “휃ˆ”. He updates accordingly his beliefs about the
quality of the innovator’s idea. The developer assesses the benefits from stealing the
idea and walking away from the relationship with these updated beliefs. If he leaves,
the game ends with payoff 퐸(푢(휃)∣풞, “휃ˆ”) to the developer and 0 to the innovator.
∙ Fourth, the developer pays an up-front payment 푎 to the principal if he has not
opted out. He then exerts a non-verifiable effort 푒.
∙ Fifth, the innovation may either succeed or fail and some royalties of 휋−푤 are paid
to the innovator in the case of success.
Our equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In what follows, we will
focus on the least-costly separating equilibrium19 since it is the only equilibrium which
survives standard equilibrium refinements like Cho and Kreps (1987).20 In such outcomes,
the different types of innovators separate from one another in their strategy of providing
evidence and designing contract terms. Finding this least-costly separating allocation is
made easier by the fact that, on the equilibrium path, the developer has correct point mass
beliefs on the innovator’s idea. Off the equilibrium path, we assume that any unexpected
contractual offer21 is followed with pessimistic beliefs, with the developer assuming that
the innovator has the worst possible idea.22 23
Because 푢(휃) ≥ 0 for all 휃 in Θ, the binding participation constraint is obtained when
the developer is prevented from reneging on the contract. In this situation, only the
enforcement constraint matters.
∙ Complete information on 휃. To provide some preliminary intuition underlying our
analysis, suppose first that the quality of the innovator’s idea 휃 is common knowledge.
There is no need to produce evidence to convince the developer. The only contractual
19This corresponds to the Riley outcome, see Riley (1979).
20Pooling equilibria also arise but they are ruled out by that refinement. As most of the literature, we
will thus focus on this refined separating equilibrium.
21Because we focus on a separating allocation, both kinds of evidence “휃¯” and “휃” are produced at
equilibrium. Out of equilibrium moves come thus only from modifying bonuses and royalties.
22For a justification of these out-of-equilibrium beliefs, see Mailath (1987).
23The game form above is an informed principal problem in a common values environment with moral
hazard on the developer’s side, i.e., the innovator’s private information about his idea affects directly
the developer’s payoff from contracting as well as his payoff from reneging through the probability of
success. Contrary to Maskin and Tirole (1992)’s analysis of the informed principal’s problem, we do not
allow the innovator to offer an “option contract”, i.e., a menu of contracts (푐(휃), 푐(휃¯)) from which the
innovator chooses after the developer has accepted or not the offer. The main motivation for our focus
on simple contracts is both simplicity and realism. However, if we were considering this larger strategy
space, our conclusions would be unchanged. Maskin and Tirole (1992) have indeed shown that the set
of perfect Bayesian equilibria of that game corresponds to allocations that Pareto-dominate the Riley
outcome which again survives Cho-Kreps refinement. Moreover, that outcome is essentially unique when
it is interim efficient, i.e., for 휈 small enough (proof available upon request).
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issue stems then from the non-verifiability of the developer’s effort. It is well-known that
this moral hazard problem can easily be solved by making the risk-neutral agent residual
claimant for the overall profit of the project.
Consider thus the simple “sell-out” contract 풞∗(휃) = (푤∗(휃), 푎∗(휃)) such that
푤∗(휃) = 휋 and 푎∗(휃) = 휃휋 +
휆2휋2
2
− 푢(휃).
Since he enjoys the full marginal gain from increasing the probability of an innovation,
the developer exerts the first-best level of effort 푒∗(휃) = 휆휋. The innovator can extract
the developer’s gains from trade by asking for an upfront payment that makes him just
indifferent between walking away or not. Moral hazard on the developer’s side is not an
issue when the quality of the idea 휃 is common knowledge and the complete information
outcome can easily be achieved.
When 휃 is common knowledge, the innovator’s payoff can be written as:
푉 ∗(휃) = 푎∗(휃) = 휃휋 +
휆2휋2
2
− 푢(휃). (1)
Since the marginal value of an idea is greater inside than outside the relationship, namely
훾 < 1, 푉 ∗(휃) is non-negative and a better idea necessarily increases the innovator’s payoff
and the developer’s up-front payment.
It is worth noting that the developer’s reservation payoff is always less steep than the
aggregate expected surplus 푉 ∗(휃) + 푢(휃) of the project:
푉 ∗(휃¯) + 푢(휃¯)− (푉 ∗(휃) + 푢(휃)) = Δ휃휋 ≥ 푢(휃¯)− 푢(휃).
This condition simply expresses that the relative gains of having greater ideas are higher
within the contract than outside. It plays a role in showing that bonuses are distorted
under asymmetric information.
4 Equilibrium Contracts
The case where 휃 is common knowledge already pointed out the difficulty in writing
efficient contracts under asymmetric information. Clearly, the innovator would exaggerate
the value of his idea if the scheme 풞∗(휃) were still offered under asymmetric information.
We now turn to the design of contracts in this case and show how it differs from the
complete information benchmark.
∙ Incentive compatibility. Let us now describe the incentive feasible contracts 풞(휃ˆ) =
{푤(휃ˆ), 푎(휃ˆ)}휃ˆ∈Θ which are offered in a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the
12
innovator is privately informed on 휃. For any 휃 ∈ Θ, we denote by 푉˜ (휃, 휃ˆ) the type
휃 innovator’s expected payoff when he provides evidence “휃ˆ” and proposes a contract
풞(휃ˆ) and by 푉 (휃) = 푉˜ (휃, 휃) his payoff when following a truthtelling strategy, i.e., when
proposing the equilibrium contract corresponding to his type. We have:
푉˜ (휃, 휃ˆ) = (휃 + 휆푒(휃ˆ))(휋 − 푤(휃ˆ)) + 푎(휃ˆ)− 휑(휃ˆ − 휃) (2)
where 푒(휃ˆ) is the agent’s effort when the contract 풞(휃ˆ) has been chosen by the principal and
the developer has put mass beliefs on the innovator’s type being 휃ˆ. This effort maximizes
the developer’s expected payoff:
푒(휃ˆ) = arg max
푒
{
(휃ˆ + 휆푒)푤(휃ˆ)− 푒
2
2
− 푎(휃ˆ)
}
= 휆푤(휃ˆ). (3)
At a separating equilibrium, the innovator with idea 휃 prefers to offer (푎(휃), 푤(휃)) and
provide costlessly evidence “휃”. This yields a greater payoff than offering any other
contract and providing any other pieces of evidence. Let us first focus on the incentive
compatibility constraints that prevent an innovator with type 휃 to offer the contract and
provide evidence for being another type 휃ˆ.24 These constraints can be written as
푉 (휃) = max
휃ˆ∈Θ
푉˜ (휃, 휃ˆ) (4)
or equivalently as
(휃+휆2푤(휃))(휋−푤(휃))+푎(휃) ≥ (휃+휆2푤(휃ˆ))(휋−푤(휃ˆ))+푎(휃ˆ)−휑(휃ˆ−휃) ∀(휃, 휃ˆ) ∈ Θ2. (5)
Taking into account the fact that the cost of providing evidence is zero for type 휃¯ and
휑(Δ휃) for type 휃 if he lies upward, standard revealed preferences obtained by summing
the incentive constraints (5) for types 휃 and 휃¯ immediately yield:
Δ휃(푤(휃)− 푤(휃¯)) + 휑(Δ휃) ≥ 0. (6)
Intuitively, a good innovator can only credibly convince the developer that he is good by
keeping enough royalties. To send a credible signal on the quality of his idea, the good
innovator reduces the marginal incentives of the developer. In other words, an immediate
prediction of asymmetric information is that royalties are more attractive for innovators
having good rather than bad ideas.
Finally, given the out-of equilibrium pessimistic beliefs sustaining our separating al-
location, the best strategy for a bad innovator consists in providing evidence “휃” and
offering the full information contract 풞∗(휃) = (휋, 푎∗(휃)). Such an innovator gets thereby
24We study in the Appendix the incentive constraints stipulating that this innovator with type 휃 does
not want to make any unexpected offer.
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a payoff 푉 ∗(휃) given by (1). The upward incentive constraint that prevents an innovator
with a bad idea from mimicking an innovator with a better one can be written as:
푉 ∗(휃) ≥ 푉 (휃¯)−Δ휃(휋 − 푤(휃¯))− 휑(Δ휃). (7)
This incentive constraint is binding for the least-costly separating allocation. In such an
allocation, the good innovator wants to credibly convince the developer that he is so and
does this by separating himself from the bad innovator. It is clear from this inequality
that using royalties when the idea is good reduces the developer’s bonus and relaxes the
incentive constraint.
This incentive constraint also shows the significant role of the technology for producing
evidence. When 휑(Δ휃) = 0, information is completely soft and no evidence whatsoever
can be understood as a meaningful signal of the innovator’s idea. The incentive constraint
can then only be relaxed by increasing the innovator’s royalties. When 휑(Δ휃) is instead
positive, i.e., a bad innovator finds it harder to provide favorable evidence, royalties can
be reduced while still maintaining incentive compatibility. This points to the important
substitutability between pre-contractual production of evidence and royalties.
Given that 풞∗(휃) = (휋, 푎∗(휃)) for a separating equilibrium, we may rewrite (6) as:
Δ휃(휋 − 푤(휃¯)) + 휑(Δ휃) ≥ 0
which automatically holds when the bonus 푤(휃¯) cannot exceed the value of the project 휋.
∙ Enforcement constraint. A separating contract is feasible if it prevents the developer
from leaving the relationship upon inferring 휃 from the choice of the contract 풞(휃). The
following enforcement constraint must thus be satisfied:
휃푤(휃) +
휆2푤2(휃)
2
− 푎(휃) ≥ 푢(휃), ∀휃 ∈ Θ. (8)
The corresponding enforcement constraint for a developer who learns that the innovator’s
idea is a good one is important to characterize the least-costly separating allocation. This
constraint can also be written as:
휃¯휋 + 휆2푤(휃¯)
(
휋 − 푤(휃¯)
2
)
− 푢(휃¯) ≥ 푉 (휃¯). (9)
This condition expresses the fact that the good innovator can at most get the whole
surplus of the relationship net of the developer’s reservation payoff.
∙ Least-costly separating allocation. We are now ready to state the good innovator’s
problem who tries to separate himself from a bad innovator:
(ℛ) : max
푉 (휃¯),푤(휃¯)∈[0,휋]
푉 (휃¯) subject to (7) and (9).
14
Finally, one should note that when the falsification cost is high enough, the first-best
solution is also implementable in an asymmetric information environment, i.e., it solves
(ℛ) and (7) is slack. To avoid this less interesting solution, we assume that this cost
is not too high. Therefore, we will use throughout the rest of the paper the following
assumption:
Assumption 1 휑(Δ휃) < Δ휃휋 − (푢(휃)− 푢(휃)).
5 Trading Off Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
5.1 Characterization of Equilibrium Contracts
Solving problem (ℛ), the least-costly separating contract (indexed with the superscript
푅) has the following feature
Proposition 1 Assume that Δ휃 is small enough, i.e.,25
휋 − 휑(Δ휃) + 푢(휃¯)− 푢(휃)
Δ휃
>
5
8휆2
Δ휃. (10)
Then the least-costly separating contract entails:
★ Both the incentive constraint (7) and the enforcement constraint (9) are binding.
★ A downward distortion of the developer’s bonus and effort below their first-best values
when contracting with a good innovator:
0 ≤ 푤푅(휃¯) < 푤푅(휃) = 휋 and 0 ≤ 푒푅(휃¯) < 푒푅(휃) = 휆휋
with
푤푅(휃¯) = 휋 − 1
휆2
(√
Δ휃2 + 2휆2(Δ휃휋 − (휑(Δ휃) + 푢(휃¯)− 푢(휃)))−Δ휃
)
; (11)
★ The fee 푎푅(휃¯) is lower than under complete information on 휃:
푎푅(휃¯) = 휃푤푅(휃¯) +
휆2
2
(푤푅(휃¯))2 − 푢(휃¯) < 푎∗(휃¯). (12)
25This restriction is sufficient to ensure that out-of-equilibrium offers are never profitable for any type.
See the Appendix for details.
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To understand these results, remember that, with the contract 풞∗(휃) designed in the
complete information scenario, a bad innovator pretends to be a good one by asking for
a greater fixed fee which will be paid upfront by the developer. To prevent this strategic
behavior, the least-costly separating contract increases royalties for the good innovator.
Using royalties is then a credible signal that the idea is good. However, the use of royalties
also reduces the developer’s share of returns on innovation. By the same token, the
innovator can no longer ask for as large a fixed fee as under complete information and
convincing the developer to stay within the relationship becomes harder.
Relying strongly on royalties can also lead to consequences on the developer’s incen-
tives to exert effort. Since the private returns on effort are now lower than their social
value, effort is underprovided. This illustrates the important trade-off between adverse
selection and moral hazard that arises in our contracting environment with double-edged
incentives.
5.2 Comparative Statics
We provide now some comparative statics with respect to the main parameters of our
model. These exercises will point out some key determinants of contracting arrangements.
Corollary 1 The least-costly separating bonus 푤푅(휃¯) increases with the marginal cost of
falsification 휑(Δ휃) and the difference 푢(휃¯)− 푢(휃). Moreover the probability of innovation
with a good idea is lower than the probability of innovation with a bad idea when:
휋 − 휑(Δ휃) + 푢(휃¯)− 푢(휃)
Δ휃
>
3
2휆2
Δ휃.26 (13)
Technology for producing evidence: Royalties are more attractive for a good innova-
tor when the direct production of evidence makes it easier for a bad innovator to provide
false evidence that he is good. On the contrary, the developer’s bonus is closer to its
first-best value and the moral hazard problem downstream is less acute when the bad
innovator finds it more difficult to forge favorable evidence.
Forging pre-contractual evidence may vary in difficulty, and the cost of falsification
certainly depends on the nature of the innovation. In quickly evolving sectors like the
bio-tech or the software industries, it might be easier to “fool” uninformed parties on the
quality of a new process (휑(Δ휃) small). In more mature sectors, ”fooling” might be harder
(휑(Δ휃) large). Our theory predicts that, in the first case, contracting distortions are more
pronounced, while in the second case, relying on more direct production of evidence is
preferable to using royalties given their negative impact on downstream incentives.
26Note that (13) is more stringent than (10).
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Reservation payoffs: There is less downward distortion of the bonus 푤푅(휃¯) when the
developer’s reservation payoff is steeper, i.e., when 푢(휃¯)− 푢(휃) > 0 gets larger. This will
typically be the case when 퐼 is not too high, i.e., IPRs are weak enough.
A steeper reservation payoff profile can be obtained when 퐼 diminishes in the case of
intermediate imitation costs and/or when 훾 increases. When quitting the relationship
becomes attractive for the developer, the innovator can no longer easily convince the
developer that he has a good idea by keeping a larger stake of the project. The trade-off
between signaling and moral hazard is tilted against signaling. Royalties should then
decrease to avoid idea-stealing.
For low imitation costs, the difference 푢(휃¯) − 푢(휃) = 훾Δ휃휋 does not depend on 퐼. A
change in the legal environment that would make IPRs easier to enforce has no impact
on the developer’s incentives. For intermediate levels instead, increasing 퐼 reduces the
developer’s reservation payoff 푢(휃¯) and increases the use of royalties as a signaling device.
Incentives “in” and incentives “out” are correlated: The discussion above shows
that the developer’s incentives inside the relationship reflect his incentives outside as well.
These incentives are stronger when the developer can easily walk away and benefit more
from his own effort in developing an alternative business. More generally, contracting
with the innovator always gives the developer greater incentives to exert more effort than
what he would exert on his own. Formally, the second-best bonus 푤푅(휃) is indeed such
that:
푤푅(휃¯) >
푢(휃¯)− 푢(휃)
Δ휃
=
{
훾휋 for small imitation costs
푢(휃¯)
Δ휃
for intermediate imitation costs.
Innovation slow-down: Signaling requires dampening the developer’s incentives when
he works on a good project. An important issue is whether this distortion is enough to
reduce the overall probability of innovation. When (13) holds, the downward distortion
in effort that follows a decrease in the bonus left to a developer working on a good project
is so large that it offsets any intrinsic advantage of a better idea. This reversed ranking
of the probabilities of innovation is more likely when the developer’s reservation payoff
profile is rather flat. In the case of low imitation costs, this requires 훾 low enough which
means that the innovator’s human capital is really key to the project. Intuitively, when
the innovator’s human capital is a major input of the innovation process, the developer’s
reservation payoffs when contracting out are quite small. It becomes easy to distort
downward incentives within the contract and this significantly decreases the probability
of innovation even with a good idea.
Moreover, the dampening effect on effort is greater when the falsification cost 휑(Δ휃)
is smaller. As forging favorable evidence becomes easier, the good innovator finds it more
necessary to ask for royalties even if this lowers the developer’s equilibrium effort. To
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the extent that one is ready to think of an increase in those falsification costs as coming
from a more detailed and lengthy pre-contractual stage, this finding suggests that the
innovation slow-down might be mitigated with more detailed pre-contractual procedures.
6 Extensions and Robustness Checks
6.1 Ex ante Investment
In the previous model, we have taken as given the information structure. More realis-
tically, one may want to model the production of knowledge by the innovator and un-
derstand how contracting arrangements influence the process by which good ideas are
generated. Let us assume then that the innovator can make some ex ante monetary in-
vestment 푖 that increases the probability 휈(푖) ∈ [0, 1] of generating good ideas (휈(⋅) is
increasing, concave and satisfies the Inada conditions 휈 ′(0) = +∞ and 휈 ′(+∞) = 0 to
keep interior solutions). One may think of such investment as building up new research
facilities or hiring more productive and talented researchers in the research unit. Denoting
푉 (휃¯) and 푉 ∗(휃) the net payoffs of innovators with respectively a good and a bad idea in
the continuation separating equilibrium described above, the optimal ex ante investment
푖∗ solves:
푖∗ = arg max
푖
휈(푖)푉 (휃¯) + (1− 휈(푖))푉 ∗(휃)− 푖⇔ 1 = 휈 ′(푖∗)(푉 (휃¯)− 푉 ∗(휃)).
Because 푉 (휃¯) < 푉 ∗(휃¯), the ex ante incentives to invest are lower than under complete
information on 휃, an effect that may exacerbate the innovation slow-down we stressed
above since good ideas become less likely. Moreover, one can show 27 that the differential
gains 푉 (휃¯) − 푉 ∗(휃) increase with 퐼. Therefore, the stronger the IPRs, the higher the
level of ex ante investment and thus the proportion of good ideas in the economy. This
points to the role that a greater protection of property rights might play. It facilitates
information revelation ex post as well as generating better ideas ex ante.
6.2 Double Moral Hazard
In many R&D projects, innovators might be actively involved not only at the inception of
a project but also later on at development stages, as experts or advisers, whose incentives
at which point are also at stake. We now analyze how this moral hazard on the innovator’s
side modifies the fundamental trade-off between adverse selection and moral hazard. To
do so, we assume that, although the innovator is not able to carry out the project alone, he
27At least for 휆 not too high.
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can exert a non-observable and non-verifiable effort 휖 which also increases the probability
of an innovation. This probability becomes 푝(휃, 푒, 휖) = 휃 + 휆푒 + 훼휖 where 훼 ∈]0, 1] is a
scale parameter capturing the impact of the innovator’s effort.
On top of inducing information revelation, the contract must now induce both the
innovator and the developer to exert enough effort. Given the contract chosen by the
developer 풞(휃ˆ) = (푤(휃ˆ), 푎(휃ˆ)), the developer and the innovator choose non-cooperatively
their respective efforts.28 This yields the following moral hazard incentive constraints:
휖(휃ˆ) = 훼
(
휋 − 푤(휃ˆ)
)
and 푒(휃ˆ) = 휆푤(휃ˆ). (14)
Even when 휃 is common knowledge, solving the moral hazard in teams problem already
requires sharing returns between the innovator and the developer.29 Under asymmetric
information on 휃, the relevant upwards adverse selection incentive constraint of a bad
innovator is still given by (7). The least-costly separating allocation requires again in-
creasing the royalties of the good innovator which then puts a positive impact on his
effort. Royalties are more attractive when the innovator’s involvement in the project is
long-lasting.
6.3 Complementarity Between Ideas and Development
So far, we have assumed that the probability of success was additively separable in the
developer’s effort and the innovator’s idea. This separability ensured that the first-best
effort did not depend on the innate quality of the project and allowed us to stress the
impact of signaling on dampening incentives downstream.
Suppose now that effort and ideas are complement at the intrinsic margin also. The
probability of success can be written as 푝(휃, 푒) = 휆휃푒 with values of those parameters
such that this number is always less than one at equilibrium.
The first-best effort 푒∗(휃) = 휆휃휋 is now type-dependent, with the developer finding
it worthwhile to supply more effort when associated with a better innovator. Similarly,
when stealing the idea and running his own business, the developer would supply 훾푒∗(휃)
and get a reservation payoff 푢(휃) = max{0, (1− 훾2)(휆휃)2휋 − 퐼}.
28We restrict ourselves to the case where the innovator and the developer cannot commit to “burn
money” which would facilitate solving the moral hazard in teams problem they face. With this proviso,
fixed fees and royalties upon successful projects define the most general class of contracts.
29For completeness, notice that the optimal full information bonus is given by 푤∗ = 휆
2
휆2+훼2휋. It corre-
sponds to the full information payoff of an innovator given by 푉 ∗(휃) = 휃휋+ 휋
2
2(휆2+훼2)
(
휆4 + 훼4 + 휆2훼2
)−
푢(휃).
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Rewriting the bad innovator’s incentive constraint in this context, we obtain:
푉 ∗(휃) =
(휆휃휋)2
2
− 푢(휃) ≥ 푉 (휃¯)− (휆)
2
2
(휃¯2 − 휃2)푤(휃¯)(휋 − 푤(휃¯))− 휑(Δ휃).
As in the additive case, leaving royalties to the innovators, i.e., reducing 푤(휃¯) below
휋, certainly relaxes this incentive constraint. However, in this multiplicative model, these
dampened incentives come with a consequence. Reducing too much 푤(휃¯) shifts the prob-
ability of success too close to zero and this is not so attractive for a good innovator. Put
differently, complementarity between ideas and efforts means that royalties might not be
such an attractive option.
6.4 Bargaining Power
Our assumption that the developer has no bargaining power, although legitimate given
the innovator’s access to privileged information, can be relaxed. Suppose that contracts
are negotiated through Nash bargaining. To simplify, let us give equal bargaining power
to each contracting partner.
Under full information, the innovator’s payoff is now 푉 ∗푁(휃) =
1
2
푉 ∗(휃). Under asym-
metric information, the bad innovator’s incentive constraint in the least-costly separating
equilibrium becomes:
푉 ∗푁(휃) ≥ 푉푁(휃¯)−
Δ휃
2
(휋 − 푤(휃¯))− 휑(Δ휃).
This expression makes it clear that the innovator’s gains from playing “truthfully” are
now half those he would have received when having all the bargaining power. The gains
of offering the same contract as a good innovator are also divided by two. If there was
no possibility of producing favorable evidence, the equilibrium policy would be just the
same as when the innovator has all the bargaining power. However, notice that the cost
of producing wrong evidence is not borne at a separating equilibrium by any type whereas
it is borne at full value by a bad innovator when deviating. Overall, everything happens
as if the cost of producing evidence had been doubled. In that respect, reducing the
innovator’s bargaining power makes it easier to satisfy the signaling incentive constraint
and tilts the choice of the incentive schemes against royalties. The same trade-off between
signaling and dampened incentives as in our previous model does arise but it is of a much
lower magnitude.
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7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed contract design between an informed innovator and a developer
in a variety of settings. This design is complex because it optimally responds to various
contractual hazards. Indeed, a contract must simultaneously induce the innovator to
convey information on the value of his idea, while providing incentives to the developer
to exert effort and protect the innovator’s IPRs.
To prevent bad innovators from exaggerating the quality of their ideas, the best in-
novators signal themselves by asking for more royalties. This reduces the developers’
share of returns on a successful project and dampens his incentives. The magnitude of
that distortion depends significantly on both market conditions and the technology of
contracting, especially on how easy it is to forge false evidence during the pre-contractual
negotiation.
Royalties are attractive under a variety of circumstances, in particular when IPRs can
be easily enforced and when the innovator may be involved at later development stages
of the project.
More broadly, our analysis points at the fact that the diffusion of knowledge over
the whole economy depends significantly on the contracts and the regime of IPRs that
prevail. The cost of informational asymmetries, which might come for example in terms of
innovation slow-down, and the role that those contractual forms play have certainly been
overlooked by the existing endogenous growth literature. This suggests that much work
remains in reconciling the micro-perspective of our paper and the more macro-oriented
view of the growth literature.
An important extension of our work would be to consider ex ante competition between
potential developers. Such competition is likely to relax the enforcement constraint and
it has roughly the same features as making IPRs easier to enforce.30 We thus predict that
more competition makes royalties more attractive to innovators.
Finally, we believe that the lessons of our model can also be viewed as a building
block for a more thorough analysis of organizational forms (vertical integration between
upstream and downstream units, research-joint ventures, etc...) that facilitate innovation.
We plan to investigate some of these issues in future research.
30In the spirit of Anton and Yao (1994).
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Appendix
∙ Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1: Note first that the monotonicity constraint
(6) can be easily checked ex post in the least-costly separating allocation since 푤푅(휃¯) found
below is less than 휋.
Let us now turn to the solution to problem (ℛ). Observe first that (7) does not hold
for the full information solution obtained when only (9) is binding.
Suppose that only (7) is binding. Then, it is optimal to set 푤(휃¯) = 0 and we would
obtain:
푉 (휃¯) = 푉 ∗(휃) + Δ휃 = 푉 ∗(휃¯) > 휃¯휋 − 푢(휃¯)
which contradicts with our starting assumption that (9) is slack.
Therefore, necessarily both constraints (7) and (9) are binding at the solution to (ℛ).
We can now rewrite (ℛ) as:
(ℛ′) : max
푤(휃¯)∈[0,휋]
휃¯휋 + 휆2푤(휃¯)
(
휋 − 푤(휃¯)
2
)
subject to
휃휋 +
휆2휋2
2
− 푢(휃) = −Δ휃(휋 − 푤(휃¯)) + 휃¯휋 + 휆2푤(휃¯)
(
휋 − 푤(휃¯)
2
)
− 푢(휃¯)− 휑(Δ휃). (A.1)
The optimal 푤(휃¯) is obtained when solving (A.1) which is a second-order equation in
푤(휃¯) that can be rewritten as:
휆2
2
푤2(휃¯)− (휆2휋 + Δ휃)푤(휃¯) + 휆
2휋2
2
+ 휑(Δ휃) + 푢(휃¯)− 푢(휃) = 0. (A.2)
Keeping the only solution which is less than 휋 yields (11).
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Turning now to the fixed fee, the value of 푎푅(휃¯) immediately follows from (9) being
binding.
Finally, we need to check that the incentive constraints of an innovator with a good
idea 휃¯ is slack. First, this means that this innovator should not be willing to offer the same
contract as the innovator with a bad idea. This corresponds to the following incentive
constraint:
푉 푅(휃¯) = 휃¯휋 + 휆2푤푅(휃¯)
(
휋 − 푤
푅(휃¯)
2
)
− 푢(휃¯) > 푉 ∗(휃) + Δ휃(휋 − 푤푅(휃)) = 푉 ∗(휃)
which immediately follows from (7) being itself binding.
Also, the equilibrium offer (푤푅(휃¯), 푎푅(휃¯)) must be preferred by the innovator with
idea 휃¯ to any out-of-equilibrium contract whose offer is followed by pessimistic beliefs. In
that case, of course, there is no point forging favorable evidence. This gives the following
incentive constraint:
푉 푅(휃¯) ≥ max
{푤∈[0,휋],푎≤휃푤+휆2
2
푤2−푢(휃)}
푎+ (휃¯ + 휆2푤)(휋 − 푤) (A.3)
The right-hand side of (A.3) can also be written as:
max
푤∈[0,휋]
휃휋 + Δ휃(휋 − 푤) + 휆2푤
(
휋 − 푤
2
)
− 푢(휃) = 푉 ∗(휃) + Δ휃
2
2휆2
.
Given that (7) is binding, (A.3) is satisfied when (10) holds. Since 푢(휃¯)− 푢(휃) < 훾휋Δ휃,
and that 휑′(0+) = limΔ휃→0
휑(Δ휃)
Δ휃
= 0 this property holds when Δ휃 is small enough.
Concerning Corollary 1, from (11) differentiating 푤푅(휃¯) with respect to 휑(Δ휃) and
푢(휃¯)−푢(휃) leads to the result. Finally, the probability of an innovation with a bad (resp.
good) idea is 휃+휆2휋 (resp. 휃¯+휆2푤푅(휃¯)). We have 휃+휆2휋 > 휃¯+휆2푤푅(휃¯) when condition
(13) holds.
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